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PRESS ADVISORY

Secretary of Defense William Perry will attend a breakfast meeting hosted by The Asia Society at 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, May 3, 1994, at the National Press Club Lounge in Washington, D.C. Dr. Perry will be making remarks about the U.S. government's policy in Korea. The event is open to the news media. The point of contact at the Asia Society Regional Center is Judy Sloan or Melissa Malone, at 202- 387-6500.

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Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's

Speech to the Asia Society

at the

National Press Club

on

Tuesday, May 3 1994

Secretary Perry: Thank you very much, Ambassador Clark.

Today, I would like to talk to you about my recent trip to Korea, and in particular, try to answer the critical question that was often posed to me on this trip and since this trip. The question, how is it possible to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula without creating an unacceptable risk of war?

To achieve those objectives, I believe we must focus on two critical efforts. The first is a diplomatic effort. We must make every diplomatic move to convince North Korea that a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula is in everyone's interest, and in particular, in North Korea's interest. And North Korea must understand that the world community is united on this goal.

The second effort is for the United States and South Korea to be fully prepared to defend South Korea should the North Koreans take a rash action. North Korea must understand that starting a war would not only be rash, but it would be self destructive.

Today North Korea threatens the peace and stability of Northeast Asia which holds the world's fastest growing economies. By the first years of the next century, East Asia and the Pacific will likely account for about one-third of the world's economic activity, and the markets created by these region's economies are increasingly important to the economic health of the United States.

Last year our trade with the Asia-Pacific region amounted to over $370 billion -- 40 percent greater than U.S. trade with Europe, and almost three million American jobs depend upon this trade. The growth of Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan since the 2nd World War has been nothing short of phenomenal, but the foundation of sustained economic growth anywhere is peace and stability, and it is very clear that Northeast Asia's peace and stability has been largely the result of America's military strength and its commitment to the region.

The key to that commitment is our security relationships with South Korea Japan, and the biggest threat to the peace and stability of that region today emanates from North Korea.

North Korea has an unreasonably large conventional military force which we estimate consumes about 25 percent of its gross domestic product, thereby keeping its citizens impoverished. If you compare the 25 percent that North Korea invests in its military with the three percent invested by the United States, South Korea, Western European countries, and the one percent invested by Japan, you get a very clear picture of why the people in North Korea live in economic deprivation.

Two-thirds of North Korea's million-man army is based within 60 miles of the DMZ, and much of this force is less than 50 miles from Seoul. This army has thousands of tanks and artillery pieces. It has built large tunnels under the DMZ and it has established a very large

complement of special operation forces. For decades, this excessive military force has threatened its neighbor to the south. And in the last few years, North Korea has increased both the size and the forward deployment of these forces.

But notwithstanding this buildup, there can be no doubt that the combined forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States could decisively defeat any attack from the North. This deterrent value of the United States and South Korean military forces has maintained the peace on the Korean Peninsula for four decades, and continues to maintain it today. Indeed, I believe there is no danger of an imminent military confrontation in Korea.

However, during the last few years a new development has emerged -- a major North Korean nuclear weapons program. This program could very well threaten the stability on the Korean Peninsula today.

In discussing this nuclear program, it is important to be clear about what we know and what we don't know about it. While many elements of this program are still unknown, we do know with certainty that the North Koreans have an operational 25 megawatt nuclear reactor. They have under construction a second 200 megawatt reactor. They have a large reprocessing plant separating plutonium from the reactor spent fuel. They have radiochemistry laboratories, and they have a high explosive testing facility, all located in Yongbyon.

We also know that when this 200 megawatt reactor is completed in a few years, it will have the potential to produce enough material for 10 to 12 nuclear bombs a year.

The most reasonable explanation for this known collection of facilities is a nuclear weapons program. This program has now reached a critical juncture.

The 25 megawatt nuclear reactor has, as we speak, a load of spent fuel that if reprocessed after being removed from the reactor, could provide enough plutonium for four or five nuclear bombs. The reactor has recently been shut down -- a preliminary step needed to cool the core sufficiently to conduct a refueling operation.

North Korea has declared that they intend to discharge and then to refuel the reactor, and they have invited the IAEA to be present during this process. We believe that it is critically important for the IAEA -- the International Atomic Energy Agency -- to be present at this unloading of the reactor, and to conduct the necessary procedures to provide safeguards that the spent fuel from the reactor is not diverted to a nuclear weapons program. So we welcome this offer by North Korea, and we hope that it is serious.

Talks are now underway between North Korea and the IAEA to determine whether North Korea will permit the IAEA to be not only present, but to conduct the inspections they believe are necessary to provide safeguards.

We understand that the technology and the operating history of the 25 megawatt reactor make it technically necessary to do this refueling very soon. But at the same time, it is our top priority to be sure that this refueling does not lead to diversion of the spent fuel to reprocessing into weapons grade plutonium.

It is equally important that this not become a source of new uncertainty about the use of spent fuel. We know that the last time that the 25 megawatt reactor was unloaded, it was done without any outside, independent observation. We don't know how much was unloaded or what they did with the fissile material. We can only estimate how much was unloaded, and whether or not it was diverted to a bomb program.

The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has estimated that the plutonium from this last unloading may have been used already to build at least one nuclear device. We do not want this uncertainty to multiply with the present refueling. Observation of the refueling is a most important first step in containing the North Korean nuclear program, because it assures us that the fuel is not reprocessed, and that it stays under international observation.

But we need to go farther than simply containing this program. We want to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Accord which was reached last year, and to a determination of what happens to fuel that was removed when the reactor was shut down previously in the absence of outside monitoring. No doubt that this will be a long, hard process that will take both steadiness and determination on our part.

Looking beyond its nuclear program, we must take into account North Korea's other activities. We know that they're building ballistic missiles of increasing range. They can already launch SCUD missiles against virtually any target in South Korea, and they are developing longer range missiles that can strike targets in Japan, China, Russia, and other countries in the region.

Compounding our concern is North Korea's history of exporting weapons technology, including ballistic missiles, to regions of instability around the world. Tony Lake has noted, "North Korea has become one of the foremost merchants of such weapons. It has sold SCUD missiles to Syria and Iran, and it is actively marketing its next generation of ballistic missiles."

In short, if North Korea develops nuclear weapons, we face a greatly increased danger that other hostile, rogue states around the world will soon have them also.

Finally, the ruling regime of North Korea has used extreme, even shrill rhetoric including a recent infamous threat to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." We do not take every extreme North Korean figure of speech literally, but it would be imprudent not to take seriously the threat posed by North Korea's large conventional forces, its nuclear weapons program, and its harsh rhetoric.

We must also take seriously its stated intentions of affecting a reunification of Korea on the North's terms in 1995.

How the United States and its allies in the international community respond to the challenge posed by the North Korean nuclear program will be very important not only for the future security of Asia, but indeed, for the entire world. Our response to this challenge now will be a benchmark for responding to possible similar challenges in the future.

There are basically three ways that the United States and its allies can deal with the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program. First, and quite obviously, we could do nothing. Second, we could apply military pressure. Third, we could pursue a strategy to persuade North Korea that it is in their best interest to give up their nuclear weapons program.

The first option truly is untenable. Whatever dangers we face now in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program, the dangers will be compounded two or three years from now if North Korea is actually able to produce enough plutonium to fabricate nuclear weapons at a rate of about a dozen a year -- a number which is compatible with the size of the facilities which we see being constructed.

It is not satisfactory to say, as some have argued, that we could accept such a program and seek to deter North Korea from actual use of its nuclear arsenal as we deterred the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For even assuming that we could reliably deter actual use of North Korea's nuclear weapons, an unchecked nuclear capability coupled with North Korea's large conventional military forces could put North Korea in a position to subject South Korea to extortion and establishing its terms for unification. It could undermine the security of the whole entire Northeast Asia region and tempt other countries to seek their own nuclear weapons in self defense. And, as I have mentioned, a nuclear North Korea could be in a position to export nuclear technologies and weapons to terrorists or rogue regimes around the world, unleashing a nightmare spread of nuclear threat.

Thus, the North Korean nuclear weapons program is, in the long term, a program not just for the region, but for the entire world. These considerations make doing nothing an untenable option.

At the other end of the spectrum would be the application of military pressure. But even limited application of military pressure entails the risk of a large scale war. Although we will not rule out any option for all time, this course should only be considered when all other possibilities have been exhausted.

That leads us, then, to President Clinton's strategy which is diplomacy combined with military preparedness. The objectives of the President's strategy are quite clear. We want North Korea to comply fully with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the inter-Korean

denuclearization accord. The overall goal is a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, and a strong international non-proliferation regime.

I believe it is important to understand just what is at stake. First and foremost is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This is a win-win scenario for both the North and the South. It is obvious what is at stake for the South. Less obvious is what is at stake for the North. The answer is a hell of a lot.

The United States, after close consultation with the Republic of Korea and Japan, has agreed to pursue a broad and thorough approach in negotiations with North Korea if we get back to the negotiating table. What broad and thorough means in non-diplomatic jargon is that the United States is fully prepared to discuss with the North not just the nuclear issue that is a concern to us, but the full range of issues of concern to them and to us -- diplomatic, political, economic, and security. It also means that we're ready to move rapidly to resolve these issues and not bog down in endless haggling over minor issues.

We invite North Korea to join the community of nations, and we're prepared to work with North Korea to help make that happen. Thus, North Korea is at a cross roads -- not just on the nuclear issue, but also on the future of its relations with the rest of the world. We strongly urge North Korea to take the responsible path, to cooperate and to forego its nuclear ambitions.

If doing the right thing doesn't motivate North Korea, then perhaps a simple cost benefit analysis will. If the North is willing to live up to its international and bilateral nuclear obligations, we have made it clear that both we and our allies are prepared to move toward more normal, political, and economic relations with the North. That means a much needed economic assistant for its moribund economy and gradual integration into the wider Asian community.

The North would no longer find itself internationally isolated and increasingly impoverished. Its security posture would actually be much improved. All of these benefits would help North Korea and its people much more than any nuclear weapons program.

This is a truly positive vision, and we hope that the North will embrace it.

Kim Il Sung has recently declared that North Korea has no nuclear bombs, no desire to make nuclear bombs, and no secrets about such activities. There is an easy way for him to convince the world of this -- by fulfilling North Korea's commitment to the IAEA, letting the inspections go forward, and by implementing the North/South Accord to denuclearize the peninsula.

Achieving our diplomatic goal, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula without conflict will require solidarity with our allies. We have been working with great energy to build an international coalition through the United Nations to address the North Korean nuclear problem. We've also been working closely with South Korea and Japan, and consulting with Russia,

China, and others that have a stake in preserving regional stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

On my recent trip I discussed this issue with the leaders in South Korea and Japan, including the President of South Korea and the Prime Minister of Japan. I can report full solidarity with both of these important allies. This is absolutely essential. If North Korea were to perceive any daylight between our positions, it would harm our negotiations, and it could tempt North Korea towards military options.

To focus our efforts, the Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Galucci, has been designated as the Inter-Agency Coordinator for Korea. He is the point man for dealing with the North Koreans, and he joined me in my meetings with the South Koreans and the Japanese -- a sign of the close relationship between our diplomatic efforts and our military preparedness.

As we view our diplomatic efforts in light of the alternatives I've described, we must make every effort to see that this strategy succeeds. That means in dealing with a country like North Korea we should expect our negotiations to be difficult, often confrontational, and probably protracted. To be successful, we will have to be clear and firm in our goals and objectives, flexible and creative in our negotiating tactics, and remain calm through it all.

Critics who often call for what may seem to be a quick and easy solution, or who deplore the give and take essential to any negotiation, will certainly be frustrated. And those who deny the reality or severity of the problem, and consequently the acceptability of taking any risks to contain and reverse it, will also be unhappy. But those who bear responsibility for both making policy and for its consequences should, for the good of the nation, weather the criticism and vigorously pursue this diplomatic course.

President Clinton has correctly noted that our goal is not endless discussion, but certifiable compliance. If the international community cannot convince North Korea to honors its non-proliferation commitments, the UN Security Council will again take up the issues, and the North will face increasing pressure in the form of sanctions.

In particular, if North Korea were to break the continuity of safety guards, for example, by refusing to allow adequate IAEA monitoring of the spent fuel rods removed from the 25 megawatt reactor, the issue would return to the United Nations where the U.S. and others would consider appropriate steps, including sanctions. I believe that such an approach will be supported by the Republic of Korea and the world community.

We believe that this response would be commensurate with the problem posed by North Korea's refusal, and would be done with no intention of being provocative. However, North Korea has stated that the imposition of sanctions would be equivalent to a declaration of war. This is probably another example of excessive North Korean rhetoric, but as the Secretary of

Defense, I have the responsibility to provide for the adequate readiness of U.S. military forces in the face of such threats.

Our forces have been, are, and will be ready to meet any contingencies. It is vital that we continue to maintain a strong U.S. and South Korean defense capability on the peninsula to dissuade the North from acting irrationally. We cannot take any chances on this. We have to be prepared to help South Korea defend itself as we have for more than 40 years. Based on my recent trip, I can report that we are fully prepared to do so.

I note that the bulk of South Korea's defense comes from South Korea. Today it fields a potent military force of about 650,000 active duty personnel, backed up by more than 200,000 ready reservists.

Last week I visited the 1st Infantry Division of the South Korean army which is located at the tip of the spear, as they say, between Seoul and the DMZ. I can say with some personal confidence that South Korea's forces are well trained, well led, and highly motivated. Their equipment is generally high quality, and they have important modernization programs well underway.

These Republic of Korea forces are supplemented by about 100,000 U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific including a well trained, well equipped, and highly professional military force in South Korea or about 37,000 personnel. Their job is to help deter North Korean aggression, to help defend South Korea if deterrence fails, and to build South Korea's defense capabilities through combined training. It is a tough, demanding job that for most of our forces over there means a year's separation from their families.

I also met with some of our forces during my trip, in particular the 2nd Infantry Division of the U.S. Army, and commanders from the 7th Air Force and 10th Fighter Wing of the U.S. Air Force. These units are at the peak of readiness and are training constantly. We are giving them the tools to perform their mission.

We have underway a systematic modernization program for our forces in Korea. This program includes equipment such as the Patriot system which we recently deployed to provide us with a point defense system to protect such targets as airfields and ports against the SCUD missile threat. I met with the battalion commander and his staff last week at one of the new sites at which the equipment was being installed. The Patriot batteries are all now operational, ready to defend their designated areas. In addition, we are replacing the Cobra attack helicopters with AH-64 Apaches; we're replacing the M-113 armored personnel carriers with Bradley fighting vehicles; and we're significantly increasing our intelligence assets.

All of this gives the combined U.S.-Republic of Korea forces a formidable military capability, but they would still be outnumbered by North Korean forces. Therefore, should conflict occur, or even seem imminent, the U.S. forces now in Korea would be swiftly reinforced

by U.S. combat aircraft, and additional U.S. naval and ground forces. These reinforcements are intended to deal directly and rapidly with threats posed to the in-country forces. The primary threat to the combined U.S.-Republic of Korea forces are the large concentration of North Korean tanks and artillery, and the numerical advantage in forward deployed infantry forces. Combined with the tactical advantage of a short warning attack.

U.S. and Republic of Korea forces, on the other hand, have a distinct advantage in tactical air, in training, command and control, and in the potential for reinforcement.

During my visit I discussed with the combined forces commander, General Jerry Luck, the strategy he has developed to maximize our advantages and to offset the advantages of the North Koreans. For obvious reasons, I cannot discuss the details of this strategy, but I can tell you that I have developed complete confidence both in our commanders and in the strategy which they have developed.

During the last few months, much has been made about the U.S. and South Korean exercise called Team Spirit. The Team Spirit exercises are purely defensive. They improve our ability to defend South Korea by testing our abilities to reinforce, re-equip, and resupply U.S. and South Korean forces in the event of an attack from the North. They are part of an extensive and continuing program of U.S.-South Korea cooperation and joint activity for military preparedness. Successive U.S. administrations have agreed with their South Korean counterparts on supporting Team Spirit, but they have also recognized that it can be an appropriate subject of diplomacy in the context of progress on the nuclear issue.

For example, Team Spirit '92 was canceled to encourage the progress in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Team Spirit '93 was held as scheduled. Team Spirit '94 was put on the negotiating table last February as part of a complex package to induce North Korea to live up to its IAEA and North/South dialogue commitments. When North Korea reneged on those commitments, we decided -- with the Republic of Korea -- to reschedule Team Spirit. It could be suspended again if there is satisfactory progress on the outstanding issues. Absent that progress, however, Team Spirit '94 will be held this November.

North Korea has no reasonable basis to regard such measures as provocative. In fact, they are all strictly defensive measures, intended to protect South Korea and our forces from an unprovoked attack, and they are entirely capable of providing that protection. There can be no doubt that the combined U.S.-Republic of Korea forces would decisively and rapidly defeat any attack from the North.

We must understand that every course of action we could take has consequences. Acquiescing now to an active North Korean nuclear program would invite a future crisis. Taking military action now would invite an immediate crisis. Even the course we've chosen, a course which combines diplomacy with military preparedness, is not entirely free of risk. It is possible that North Korea could misperceive these efforts as provocation. We must face that possibility,

comparing that risk to the far greater risk of letting North Korea develop a capability to produce a nuclear arsenal, or the risk inherent in not maintaining the readiness of our forces.

The Chinese have a proverb. They say, "Maintain an army for a thousand days in order to employ it for one day." I would modify that by saying that we want to maintain a sufficient defense so that they will never be employed, because we all recognize that a war would result in heavy casualties and widespread destruction.

With this posture, I have confidence that we can achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula without a war. Certainly, we will not initiate a war with North Korea. Moreover, we will not provoke a war with North Korea by rash actions -- now or later. But we will not invite a war by neglecting appropriate defense preparations.

We have fought one devastating war on the Korean Peninsula in this century. We do not want to fight another.

Arguably, the North Koreans initiated their attack in 1950 because they miscalculated the political will of the United States, and because they observed a lack of military preparedness in the South. Today there can be no confusion about the solidarity between the United States and South Korea, and the resolve of the United States to defend South Korea. There can also be no confusion about the military preparedness of the combined U.S.-Republic of Korea military forces, and their ability to decisively defeat any attack from the North.

Therefore, we and North Korea should put our priority on removing this nuclear program which threatens the peace and stability in Korea; and then focus on building an economically strong peninsula based on this stability.

I thank you.

(Applause)

Q: Sir, if I understood you correctly, you have said that if North Korea breaks the continuity (inaudible) by refusing to allow appropriate IAEA inspections at the unloading and reloading, the United States will take appropriate measures, including sanctions. Is that correct, sir? That the United States is prepared to go to the Security Council and seek sanctions if the continuity of IAEA is broken at Pyongyang?

A: Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, recently there was a report out of Pyongyang that the North Korean government would like to set aside the armistice agreement of 1953 and negotiate a separate peace agreement with the United States. Do you have a comment on that?

A: I continue to believe that our best course of action here would be to deal with the North Koreans arm-in-arm with the South Koreans. It has long been an objective of North Korea

to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea, and we do not propose to let this happen.

One of the major objectives of my trip was to reaffirm that solidarity between the United States and South Korea, and I came away with a very strong feeling of solidarity with the South Koreans as well as, I might say, with the Japanese whose support is extremely important on these issues.

Q: Have you or anyone in the Administration been having talks with the Chinese on the element of (inaudible)?

A: I'm sorry, talks?

Q: With the Chinese or your Chinese counterpart or anyone in the Chinese government on the (inaudible) element in the (inaudible)?

A: We have talked with the Chinese about getting, first of all, to understand what their objectives are in the Korean Peninsula. We believe, broadly speaking, they are the same as our objectives. That is, they are opposed to the North Koreans having a nuclear weapons program. Secondly, they want very much peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese emphasis today, I'm sure you all appreciate, has been on economic growth and development, with which they've had some spectacular success, and a not insignificant part of that is the trade which they have developed with South Korea and the technology transfer with South Korea. So it would be a disaster for China if there were to be a war in the Korean Peninsula. So they very much want to avoid this. Broadly speaking, their objectives are the same.

We have discussed also with them, ways of getting their cooperation in dealing with the North Koreans, and I can only report limited progress in that regard. I believe that while they share the same objectives, they probably have very different tactics in mind for how to achieve that objective. Specifically as to whether or not they might support a request for sanctions in the United Nations, I cannot give you a confident forecast. I think it would depend very much on the context in which that sanction request might arise, and it would depend very much on whether, in their judgment, the United States and South Korea had pursued every possible diplomatic alternative to that before they went to sanctions. They have continually counseled patience in dealing with North Korea, and we have accepted the view of patience, but with certain limits.

Q: Could you review for us again what are the conditions that have to be met before the U.S. would resume talks with North Korea? And furthermore, would you comment on various charges of the possibilities of developing theater missile defense systems with Japan and possibly with Korea?

A: We have told the North Koreans that we would resume the United States/North Korean talks, the so-called third round of talks, which are these broad and thorough talks which I mentioned in my speech today, if the IAEA reports satisfactory inspection and the preservation

and safeguards. We will base this, then, on a judgment made by the IAEA of the adequacy of inspection, not by our judgment of the adequacy of the inspection.

After our talks satisfactorily begin, then the North/South have a dialogue underway which would suggest that they would resume the North/South discussions, and if those talks get underway and proceed satisfactorily, then South Korea and we are prepared to suspend Team Spirit '94. So those are the proposals that are on the table at this point.

Q: I've got a few questions. One is about the (inaudible) CIA chief saying that (inaudible). If that is the policy now (inaudible) to keep (inaudible)? And the second question is, how [can you] assess the danger of the nuclear arms (inaudible)? And is in the process, Japanese (inaudible), which (inaudible)?

A: Let me remind you, first of all, that I said in my talk, I tried to describe the background behind the estimate that the North Koreans may have one nuclear device. It is not a certainty. It is a probability.

Our objective, our policy, is to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Nuclear-free means nuclear-free. It means zero. We have two different actions underway to try to achieve that. Two related actions. The first is to contain the nuclear program now underway so that no more weapons-grade plutonium is prepared, from which additional bombs could be built. That we're doing through the IAEA, and we've tied a third round of U.S./North Korean talks to that objective.

The second objective, given that that is achieved, is to roll back the program; if they have one or two nuclear bombs, do we move those nuclear bombs as well? The IAEA inspection had no provision for doing that. That can only be achieved, as I see it, through the de-nuclearization accord made during the North/ South talks previously made. So here is a matter of having the North Koreans fulfill the commitments they made in that agreement, and fulfill them in a verifiable way.

I might add that one of the debates that the IAEA presently has in the inspection of the spent fuel rods, they want to make measurements which will reveal to them the history of what's happened to that reactor, and therefore, will give them firm information about which to make a technical forecast, not just an estimate, of how much plutonium might have been previously processed. So the IAEA might, as they conduct those measurements, be able to remove that uncertainty.

But if there is a bomb already built in North Korea, the only way of removing that bomb under present negotiations would be through the North/South Accord.

I did say that I was concerned that a North Korean nuclear bomb program might stimulate other countries in the region to form nuclear weapons programs themselves. None of those countries have stated that as an objective of theirs. My concern is that a vigorous, robust North

Korean nuclear bomb program with the delivery systems might make the temptation for countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to go ahead with the nuclear bomb program. There can be no doubt of the technical capabilities of these countries to do that. In addition, in the case of Japan, they have large quantities of plutonium left over from their reactors which would make it a simple and straight forward matter to them to go to a nuclear weapon program.

What we are trying to do is not forecast how we would react to that if it happened, we're trying to prevent circumstances arising that would pose any future Japanese governments with that sort of a decision.

Q: There is some criticism in Congress that in recent years South Korea has been putting certain priorities in the defense program into projects that are based on the hypothetical, long term threat from Japan, and that given the present situation, that this is out of line with what South Korea should be doing.

Did you discuss this with South Korean defense officials, and did you get any assurances from them that these air and sea defense programs that are aimed at a hypothetical threat from Japan will be downgraded in the future in terms of money spent?

A: We have for several years been concerned that the South Korean Defense Ministry was putting an inappropriate priority on their weapon system development program, along the lines which you have indicated, and have been representing to them for the last several years they ought to change those priorities. So yes, that was an item of discussion in my visit.

My report to you is that they have made very substantial changes in the last year, and that I am satisfied with the direction of their present program in that regard, putting a very much greater emphasis on preparing for their defenses to deterring possible attacks from the North.

Ambassador Clark: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(END)